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Abstract 
Until recently, research examining the self-regulation of motivation focused primarily on 
the strategies people use to bolster the amount of motivation they have for pursuing a task goal. 
In contrast, our metamotivational framework highlights the importance of also examining if 
people recognize which qualitatively distinct types of motivation (e.g., promotion vs. prevention) 
are most helpful for achieving their goal, given the demands of the task or situation. At the heart 
of this framework is the idea that any given motivational state involves performance tradeoffs, 
such that it may be relatively beneficial for some tasks, but detrimental for others. In this piece, 
we review research suggesting that, on average, people (a) possess metamotivational knowledge 
of such tradeoffs (particularly those posited by regulatory focus theory, self-determination 
theory, and construal level theory), (b) recognize strategies that could be used to induce adaptive 
motivational states, and (c) implement this knowledge (at times) to increase the likelihood of 
performance success. We also discuss future directions for metamotivation research, including 
whether and when individual differences in metamotivational knowledge predict real-world 
outcomes, how such metamotivational knowledge develops, and whether there is a general 
metamotivational competency that predicts people’s sensitivity to a broad range of 
motivationally-relevant performance tradeoffs. 
 Word count: 200 
 Keywords: metamotivation, self-regulation, self-control, regulatory focus, construal level, 
intrinsic motivation, metacognition   
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Metamotivation: Emerging Research on the Regulation of Motivational States 
Over the past century, motivation research has identified numerous contextual and 
dispositional factors that influence people’s motivation to pursue important goals across a 
number of domains, including school, work, health, and romantic relationships. However, in 
much of this work, a primary assumption is that people are passively shaped by these factors. In 
fact, surprisingly little research has explored the ways in which individuals actively modulate 
and shift their own motivational states. One potential explanation for why researchers have 
tended to overlook the agentic role of individuals in regulating their own motivation pertains to 
the ways in which these researchers have characterized motivation in their work. That is, 
thinking of motivation as an underlying force, as a set of inputs for rational choice, or as an 
attributional response to the behavior of others (see Weiner, 1991) may lead researchers to view 
motivational states in a deterministic manner and to assume implicitly that there is not much that 
people can do to change them.  
Regardless of why researchers have tended to overlook motivation regulation as a topic 
of investigation, the little work that has been conducted on this topic suggests that people can be 
effective at regulating their own motivation. That is, some individuals possess strategies for 
enhancing particular types of motivational states (see Wolters, 2003) and these strategies can 
bolster their task engagement and performance (e.g., Schwinger & Stiensmeier-Pelster, 2012). 
However, at this point, we understand relatively little about how and when people come to 
realize that they should attempt to regulate their motivation or how they decide which strategies 
to use. Thus, to develop a more comprehensive understanding of how people regulate their 
motivation and how this regulation contributes to well-being and success across a broad number 
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of domains, we argue that researchers should begin to investigate more thoroughly the ways in 
which people think about, assess, and modulate their own motivational states.  
To aid researchers in this endeavor, this paper describes a metamotivational approach to 
investigating motivation regulation. By “metamotivation,” we mean the processes and 
knowledge involved in regulating one’s own motivational states. Drawing from the literatures on 
metacognition and behavioral self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Nelson & Narens, 1990), 
we conceptualize metamotivation as consisting of two reciprocal processes. The first process, 
which we refer to as metamotivational monitoring, involves assessing both the quantity and 
quality of one’s motivation to pursue a particular goal. The second process, which we refer to as 
metamotivational control, involves using the output of the monitoring process to select and 
execute strategies for bolstering or maintaining particular motivational states. Importantly, we 
argue that the effectiveness of both processes depends, in part, on one’s beliefs about how 
motivation functions and how it can be changed (i.e., one’s metamotivational knowledge; 
Scholer & Miele 2016; Miele & Scholer 2018; Scholer, Miele, Murayama, and Fujita, 2018). 
In what follows, we describe our metamotivational approach to studying motivation 
regulation in more detail, starting with a discussion of the historical antecedents of this approach. 
We then go on to describe some of the key tenets of the framework that we have developed for 
studying metamotivation, as well as to review recent research that has been guided by this 
framework. Finally, we conclude by discussing the practical implications of this research and by 
considering some future directions for the emerging field of metamotivation. 
Historical Foundations 
Our metamotivational approach to investigating motivation regulation is rooted in prior 
work on volition, metacognition, and emotion regulation. Theorizing about volition dates back 
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hundreds of years (see Hilgard, 1980), and was taken up as topic of empirical investigation early 
last century by psychologists such as Narziss Ach. According to Ach, the role of volition in the 
motivational system is to ensure that one’s goal or intention is not abandoned in order to pursue 
some competing impulse or motive (see Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985). This conception of volition 
was reintroduced to the psychological literature by Heckhausen (1991) and Kuhl (1984, 1985) 
toward the end of the last century. Although many researchers may consider volition to be a 
component of motivation, Kuhl’s (1984) theory of action control treats these constructs as 
distinct and non-overlapping. For Kuhl, motivation encompasses the processes by which 
individuals weigh expectancies and values in order to decide what action to engage in (i.e., goal 
selection and intention formation), whereas volition refers to the processes that ensure that 
individuals will act on their intentions in the face of competing impulses or tendencies and carry 
out these actions until their goals are completed. 
 An important aspect of Kuhl’s theory is its specification of six kinds of strategies that 
people use to exert volitional control, including strategies that target attention, emotion, 
motivation, and the environment – a list that was later expanded and organized into a hierarchical 
taxonomy by Corno (1989, 2001). These strategies have, for the most part, been empirically 
investigated as part of two separate, but overlapping literatures: the motivation regulation 
literature from within educational psychology and the self-control literature within social 
psychology. Whereas the motivation regulation literature has tended to focus on strategies that 
students use to directly target their motivation in response to a broad range of motivational 
challenges, the self-control literature has tended to focus on a broader range of volitional 
strategies applied to a specific challenge (i.e., pursuing an important goal in the face of 
competing impulses and temptations).  
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 The motivation regulation literature draws on social cognitive theories of self-regulated 
learning (see Wolters, 2003) and focuses primarily on the strategies that students use to maintain 
or bolster their task motivation in response to a variety of obstacles or challenges, such as trying 
to study material that seems uninteresting or unimportant (Sansone & Thoman, 2005, 2006; 
Schwinger & Stiensmeier-Pelster, 2012; Wolters, 2003, 2011). Much of this literature is based 
on seminal work by Sansone (Sansone, Weir, Harpster, & Morgan, 1992) and Wolters (1998). 
Sansone and her colleagues observed that when asked to complete a monotonous matrix copying 
task, participants exhibited a number of behaviors that appeared to be aimed at making the task 
more engaging, such as varying their handwriting when inputting letters/words (Sansone et al., 
1992; Sansone, Weibe, & Morgan, 1999). Notably, although these behaviors led participants to 
persist longer when the time for completing the task was open-ended (Sansone et al., 1999), they 
led to poorer performance (i.e., copying fewer letters) when time was limited (Sansone et al., 
1992; see also Smith, Wagaman, & Handley, 2009). This highlights an important insight about 
motivational trade-offs – although these behaviors enhanced interest, they also slowed 
participants down; thus, depending on how performance was assessed, the same strategy could 
facilitate or hinder achievement.  
 Whereas Sansone’s work highlights how people attempt to regulate interest and the 
consequences of this regulation for performance, Wolters’s work (2003, 2011) examines how 
students think about managing their motivation more broadly and catalogues the strategies they 
report using in response to a variety of motivational problems. Initially, Wolters (1998) asked 
students to imagine encountering a particular motivational problem while studying (e.g., boring 
material) and to then describe what they would do in order to keep themselves motivated. 
Wolters then reviewed the students’ responses and identified fourteen categories, many of which 
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represent strategies for targeting particular motivational constructs (e.g., efficacy, mastery goals, 
interest, etc.). These categories served as the basis for a questionnaire measure of students’ 
strategies that has been refined over the past two decades and which now includes six to eight 
broad categories (depending on the version; Schwinger, Steinmayr, & Spinath, 2009; Wolters & 
Benzon, 2013; cf. Kim, Brady, & Wolters, 2018). A number of studies have examined the extent 
to which the types of strategies assessed by such questionnaires are associated with a range of 
motivational, cognitive, and metacognitive variables, as well as with students’ academic 
achievement (e.g., Eckerlein et al., 2019; Grunschel, Schwinger, Steinmayr, & Fries, 2016; 
Ljubin-Golub, Petricevic, & Rovan, 2019; Schwinger & Otterpohl, 2017; Schwinger & 
Stiensmeier-Pelster, 2012; Wolters & Benzon, 2013; Wolters & Rosenthal, 2000). Some of this 
work suggests that certain strategies (e.g., mastery self-talk) may work better than others in 
certain situations. However, there is still much to learn about the effectiveness of these strategies 
across a wide variety of contexts.  
 In contrast to the work on self-regulated learning, which has focused on how people 
respond to a variety of motivational problems, the self-control literature within social psychology 
has examined a broad range of volitional strategies (i.e., strategies targeting beliefs, emotions, 
attention, and motivation) in response to a specific type of motivational problem. As Fujita 
(2011) explains, this type of problem generally involves wanting to prioritize an abstract, distal 
motivation over a competing concrete, proximal motivation. A classic example of this kind of 
dual-motive conflict can be found in Mischel and colleagues’ work on delay-of-gratification in 
children (see Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989, for a review). In these studies, children of 
varying ages were promised a large reward (e.g., two marshmallows) if they could wait for a 
relatively long period (e.g., 15 minutes) without consuming a smaller reward (e.g., a single 
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marshmallow) that was placed in front of them. Whereas 3-year old children struggled, 5-year 
old children were increasingly able to delay gratification. Subsequent research revealed that 
these age-related differences may be due to differences in children’s knowledge of various 
strategies for “cooling” any impulsive “hot” cognitions (Mischel & Mischel, 1983).  For 
example, whereas 3-year old children mistakenly believed that attending to the immediate 
reward would assist in delay of gratification, 5-year old children increasingly understood the 
benefits of looking away and distracting themselves. Later research revealed that individual 
differences in this sort of knowledge also predicted behavioral misconduct among older children 
with social adjustment problems (Rodriguez, Mischel, & Shoda, 1989).  
Traditionally, the “cooling” strategies used by the children in these studies have been 
interpreted as examples of cognitive control (Mischel & Mischel, 1983). However, these 
strategies (along with other self-control techniques that directly target cognitive states/processes) 
can also be viewed as indirectly contributing to motivation regulation to the extent that they 
involve deliberately disregarding “information that increases the motivation underlying… 
competing tendencies” (Kuhl, 1984, p. 183). Furthermore, by dampening or inhibiting the 
motivation associated with a proximal competing goal, these strategies might also serve to 
preserve or even bolster the motivation associated with the distal goal (Fishbach, Zhang, & 
Trope, 2010). Thus, although self-control research has typically not been framed in terms of 
motivation regulation, much of the work in this literature is relevant for understanding how 
people regulate their task motivation when faced with a competing impulse or temptation. 
Despite some clear differences in the ways that studies from the educational and social 
psychological literatures have investigated the topic of motivation regulation, there are some 
important commonalities. First, both literatures have primarily focused on identifying the 
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strategies that people use to overcome motivational problems and then assessing their 
effectiveness (i.e., metamotivational control). Second, the types of motivational problems that 
these studies have examined generally involve perceived deficits in the quantity or amount of 
one’s task motivation. In contrast to this work, the metamotivational approach to motivation 
regulation that we discuss in the next section places a strong emphasis on investigating the ways 
in which people become aware of a particular motivational problem and then decide which 
strategies would be most effective for addressing this problem (i.e., metamotivational 
monitoring). The metamotivational approach also stresses the importance of examining 
motivational problems that involve a perceived mismatch between the type of motivation one is 
experiencing and the processing demands of the task at hand (i.e., problems of motivational 
quality rather than quantity). 
Metamotivational Framework 
In this section, we briefly review some of the key tenets of our metamotivational 
framework; for a more detailed description, see Miele and Scholer (2018) and Scholer and Miele 
(2016). At the core of our framework is the idea that people monitor both the quantity and 
quality of their motivation. By “quantity” we mean the extent to which an individual desires to 
engage in a particular activity or task. Thus, our framework attempts to explain how it is that 
people become aware that this desire is waning and that they are in danger of quitting the task 
prematurely or of not putting in the level of effort needed to achieve their goal. In contrast, we 
use the word “quality” to refer to distinct types of motivation (e.g., intrinsic vs. extrinsic, 
promotion vs. prevention) that vary in terms of how they are subjectively experienced and in the 
kinds of consequences they have for goal pursuit and performance (see Miele & Wigfield, 2014; 
Vansteenkiste, Sierens, Soenens, Luyckx, & Lens, 2009). Thus, an additional aim of our 
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framework is to explain how people come to realize that they are not “motivated in the right 
way” for a given task, even when they happen to believe that they are “motivated enough.”  
Much of the research to-date testing our metamotivational framework has focused on regulation 
of motivation quality rather than quantity. This is largely because a focus on motivation quality 
is a particularly novel aspect of the framework. We have provided a more complete analysis of 
how people might regulate both the quantity and quality of motivation in other work (Miele & 
Scholer, 2018); however, in what follows, we focus on the latter in order to adhere more closely 
to empirical findings. 
Motivational Trade-offs  
The idea that there is a “right” or appropriate type of motivation for certain tasks is based 
on the assumption that tasks and situations differ in their motivational demands or affordances. 
That is, any given motivational state involves trade-offs—it will be beneficial in some 
circumstances, harmful in others, and irrelevant in yet other situations (e.g., Sansone, 2009; 
Scholer & Higgins, 2012). This assumption is consistent with arguments that have been made in 
the literatures on coping and emotion regulation. For instance, (Bonanno & Burton, 2013) argued 
that researchers have often fallen prey to a fallacy of uniform efficacy, assuming that certain 
emotion regulation strategies (e.g., reappraisal) are universally beneficial whereas others (e.g., 
suppression) are universally maladaptive.  
However, increasing evidence suggests that the ability to shift between emotion 
regulation strategies—emotion regulation flexibility—is more critical for well-being than simply 
being skilled at reappraisal (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004; Cheng, 
2003a; Chiu, Hong, Mischel, & Shoda, 1995; Kobylińska & Kusev, 2019). For example, 
although frequent exposure to trauma often increases the incidence of posttraumatic stress 
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disorder (PTSD), the ability to flexibly regulate one's emotions moderates this link: Firefighters 
who scored high on a performance measure of emotion regulation flexibility showed no 
association between trauma exposure and PTSD, whereas firefighters who scored low on this 
measure exhibited a positive association between trauma exposure and PTSD (Levy-Gigi et al., 
2016). Coping flexibility—the appropriate endorsement of distinct coping strategies (e.g., active 
vs. avoidant strategies) in confronting controllable versus uncontrollable stressful situations—
also leads to better psychological adjustment (Cheng, 2003b, 2003a; Cheng et al., 2012; Cheng, 
Chiu, Hong, & Cheung, 2001; Cheng, Lau, & Chan, 2014; Chiu et al., 1995).  
Similarly, research in motivation science reveals that there are context-specific trade-offs 
for qualitatively distinct motivation states. Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), for example, 
posits two fundamental yet qualitatively distinct motivational orientations. People who pursue 
goals with a promotion focus are generally concerned with fulfilling their need for growth and, 
thus, value these goals as ideals that they hope to attain. In order to achieve their ideals, 
promotion-focused individuals tend to adopt eager strategies, which involve seeking 
opportunities for gain and processing information in an associative, divergent, and flexible 
manner. People who pursue goals with a prevention focus, by contrast, are more concerned with 
fulfilling their need for safety and security and, thus, value these goals as responsibilities or 
duties that they feel obligated to fulfill. In order to uphold their responsibilities, prevention-
focused individuals tend to adopt vigilant strategies, which involve protecting against potential 
threats and processing information in an analytic, convergent, and careful manner (Scholer & 
Higgins, 2012). 
Importantly, research suggests that people perform well when their current motivational 
orientation is aligned with the processing demands of the task at hand (i.e., when they experience 
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task-motivation fit). For example, research suggests that individuals motivated by promotion 
concerns generally perform well on creativity tasks – tasks that demand associative and 
divergent thinking (e.g., Bittner, Bruena, & Rietzschel, 2016; Friedman & Förster, 2001)–though 
there are circumstances when prevention-focused individuals also behave creatively (e.g., Baas, 
De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2011). By contrast, individuals motivated by prevention concerns should 
generally perform well on tasks that demand careful processing and convergent thinking (e.g., 
certain types of logic problems; Seibt & Förster, 2004).  
 In contrast to past research in which task-motivation fit was experimentally created by 
researchers, the metamotivation framework proposes that people can strategically create this fit 
themselves to promote goal-directed outcomes. That is, when people understand the affordances 
of different motivational states and are sensitive to the processing demands of different tasks, 
they are able to shift themselves into promotion vs. prevention orientations in order to perform 
tasks that require divergent vs. convergent processing, respectively. People’s flexible modulation 
of their motivational states in the service of establishing task-motivation fit is the essence of 
what it means to regulate the quality of one’s motivation. 
Metamotivational Knowledge  
Whether or not individuals are successful at regulating the quality of their motivation 
should depend in part on whether they possess accurate beliefs about how motivation functions 
(i.e., metamotivational knowledge). Borrowing from research on metacognition (see Flavell, 
1979; Pintrich, 2002; Wolters, 2003), our framework posits three general categories of 
metamotivational knowledge. Strategy knowledge encompasses people’s understanding of the 
kinds of strategies they can use to bolster specific aspects of their motivation and to induce 
particular types of motivational states. Until recently, most of the motivation regulation research 
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in both educational and social psychology focused on assessing this knowledge and examining 
the kinds of outcomes it predicts (see Miele & Scholer, 2018; Mischel & Mischel, 1983; 
Rodriguez, Mischel, & Shoda, 1989; Trope & Fishbach, 2000; Wolters, 2003). Less frequently 
studied, but equally important, is people’s metamotivational task knowledge, which includes 
their beliefs about which motivational states are most beneficial for performance on a particular 
type of task. Finally, self-knowledge refers to people’s understanding of what it feels like to 
experience particular types of motivational states and their sense of efficacy for being able to 
modulate or sustain these states.  
 Our own metamotivation research, which we review in the next section, has primarily 
focused on assessing whether people possess the task and strategy knowledge needed to 
successfully regulate the quality of their motivation. More specifically, we are interested in 
whether people are generally aware of the trade-offs associated with different types of 
motivations and mindsets (promotion vs. prevention, autonomy vs. control, high- vs low-level 
construal) and whether they have a sense of the strategies they can use to take advantage of these 
trade-offs and maximize performance across a broad range of contexts and tasks. We are also 
interested in whether individual differences in this knowledge of task-motivation fit predict 
motivationally flexible behavior and important life outcomes (e.g., academic achievement, 
health, well-being) over time. 
 Finally, it is important to note that research on metamotivation has generally assumed 
that the task and strategy knowledge people possess may be tacit or implicit (e.g., Reber, 1989; 
Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). The paradigm that we typically use to assess metamotivational 
knowledge accounts for this possibility by presenting participants with scenarios or tasks that 
vary in terms of their motivational demands and then asking them to indicate what type of 
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motivation-inducing activity they would prefer to engage in before each task or which activity 
would lead them to perform optimally on the task (e.g., MacGregor et al., 2017; Nguyen, 
Carnevale, Scholer, Miele, & Fujita, 2019; Scholer & Miele, 2016). Participants who 
demonstrate and understanding of task-motivation fit seem to intuitively know which activities 
fit with which tasks, even when they are not aware that they possess this knowledge or are 
unable to explicitly articulate it. This does not preclude the possibility that some particularly 
insightful individuals are able to explicitly articulate their metamotivational knowledge; we 
simply adopt methods that do not require participants to possess this ability in order to 
demonstrate their knowledge. 
Empirical Studies of Metamotivational Knowledge 
 Research that we have conducted examining people’s metamotivational knowledge of 
task-motivation fit has thus far drawn on three prominent traditions within motivation science—
regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000), and 
construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2000). In the sections 
below, we review the sets of studies we have conducted that align with each of these theories.  
Metamotivational Knowledge About Promotion and Prevention Motivations 
As discussed earlier in the piece, whether it is better to be promotion- or prevention-
focused depends on the nature of the task. Situations that are typically best performed with 
promotion motivation may be characterized by one or all of the following: associative, divergent, 
and flexible thinking (e.g., a creative brainstorming task; Friedman & Förster, 2001); a focus on 
the abstract or big picture (e.g., developing a company’s vision statement; Förster & Higgins, 
2005); incentive structures in which gains are prevalent and rewarded (e.g., bonuses based on 
bigger-than-expected profits; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997); and times when leisure or 
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indulgence is the primary goal (e.g., a relaxing vacation; Dholakia, Gopinath, Bagozzi, & 
Nataraajan, 2006). In contrast, situations that are typically best performed with prevention 
motivation are characterized by convergent thinking (e.g., certain types of logic problems; Seibt 
& Förster, 2004); a focus on concrete details (e.g., quality control inspections; Semin et al., 
2005); incentive structures in which potential losses are prevalent and costly (e.g., military 
surveillance; Higgins et al., 1997); and times when lapses in attention are problematic (e.g., 
avoiding temptations; Freitas, Liberman, & Higgins, 2002).  
From a metamotivational perspective, this suggests that people can establish task-
motivation fit by upregulating or maintaining promotion motivation when presented with tasks 
and situations in which performance benefits from eager strategies, and by upregulating or 
maintaining prevention motivation when presented with tasks in which performance benefits 
from vigilant strategies. Thus, from a regulatory focus perspective, creation of task-motivation fit 
requires people to (a) recognize when tasks demand eagerness versus vigilance (task 
knowledge), (b) identify strategies that induce promotion versus prevention (strategy 
knowledge), and (c) select the strategy that targets the appropriate motivation and best promotes 
performance on the anticipated task.  
 Initial studies. To assess whether people possess this metamotivational knowledge, our 
initial research employed the paradigm briefly described in the previous section, which we 
adapted from studies examining people's understanding of instrumental emotion regulation (Ford 
& Tamir, 2012; Tamir, 2009; Tamir & Ford, 2012; Tamir, Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). 
Specifically, participants were presented with descriptions of tasks (e.g., brainstorming, 
proofreading) that theory and prior research suggest are performed best with eager or vigilant 
processing strategies. Participants were also presented with activities or incentive structures that 
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prior work has shown can induce promotion or prevention motivations (e.g., "recall your 
childhood aspirations" to induce promotion or "recall your childhood duties" to induce 
prevention), as well as with neutral activities (e.g., "recall your route to school this morning"). 
For each task-strategy combination, participants were asked to indicate how well they thought 
they would perform on these tasks when first engaging in a given activity or when operating 
under a particular incentive structure (e.g., gaining points for correct responses vs. losing points 
for incorrect responses). In some cases, they were also asked how much they preferred to engage 
in a particular activity.  
 Across five studies, Scholer and Miele (2016) found that North American participants 
exhibited accurate knowledge regarding task-motivation fit, such that they generally believed 
that prevention-inducing recall strategies would lead to better performance for vigilant versus 
eager tasks and at times recognized that promotion-inducing recall strategies would lead to better 
performance for eager versus vigilant tasks (participants’ expectations for neutral strategies did 
not differ as a function of task). However, there was a good deal of variability in the accuracy of 
these beliefs, suggesting individual differences in this metamotivational knowledge. In addition, 
although there was evidence that participants had knowledge of task-motivation fit, there was 
also a strong main effect of activity type, such that participants tended to endorse the general 
utility of promotion states over prevention states. Indeed, when participants had to make a 
consequential behavioral choice in two of the studies, participants overwhelmingly chose the 
promotion-inducing activity or incentive structure. 
 Given this tension between participants’ awareness of task-motivation fit and their 
general preference for promotion motivation, Scholer and Miele (2016) posited that the structure 
of the decision might influence the impact of participants’ metamotivational knowledge on their 
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consequential choices. The paradigm described thus far required participants to select a 
motivation-inducing strategy in order to prepare for an upcoming task; however, another type of 
self-regulatory challenge that people face is what task to engage in given a particular 
motivational state (e.g., I am feeling particularly eager and enthusiastic right now, so what task 
should I do first?"). Scholer and Miele (Study 5) explored whether this latter type of decision 
structure might result in a choice pattern that is more consistent with participants’ understanding 
of task-motivation fit. As predicted, when participants were presented with a prevention-
inducing preparatory activity and asked to choose a task to engage in after this activity (with the 
goal of maximizing performance), they were more likely to choose the task that required vigilant 
processing than the task that required eager processing. However, when participants were 
presented with a promotion-inducing activity, there was no difference in their likelihood of 
choosing a vigilant versus eager task. 
 Do individual difference in metamotivational knowledge predict achievement? This 
initial investigation of metamotivational knowledge suggested that, in many ways, people were 
remarkably sensitive to task-motivation fit, both in their recognition of what types of 
motivational states are optimal for a given task and what strategies can be used to induce these 
states. However, there was significant variation in this knowledge, and preliminary evidence 
from a pair of recent studies suggests that this variability can predict performance (Ross, 
Nguyen, Scholer, Fujita, & Miele, 2019). In a field study, participants completed a regulatory 
focus knowledge assessment (based on the paradigm from our previous studies) at the beginning 
of the academic term. Differences in metamotivational knowledge about regulatory focus 
predicted grades at the end of the term. A second two-part study found a similar pattern of 
results. Participants completed the regulatory focus knowledge measure in Session 1; and, in a 
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second session, they were randomly assigned to complete either a creative brainstorming task or 
a proofreading task. As in the field study, regulatory focus metamotivational knowledge 
predicted performance on both of these tasks, even when controlling for task enjoyment, 
difficulty, and prior experience.  
 Initial investigations also suggest that people appear to have accurate metamotivational 
knowledge about how to manage the promotion and prevention motivations of others. 
Specifically, Jansen, Moore, Scholer, Fujita, and Miele (2019) found that managers were more 
likely to select a promotion-focused employee (e.g., “Ellen has accomplished a lot in her time 
with the company, and can always be relied upon to spot new opportunities for company 
growth....She would like to one day lead the company to fulfill her dream of running a business”) 
for tasks that require eager processing (e.g., developing an innovative advertising campaign), but 
were more likely to select a prevention-focused employee (e.g., "Victoria has high standards that 
are in line with company values, and can always be relied upon to uphold company policy...She 
would like to one day lead the company so she can ensure financial stability for the company") 
for tasks that require vigilant processing (e.g., editing and reviewing advertisements to ensure 
they meet advertising regulations). Further, managers also exhibited accurate knowledge of task-
motivation fit when selecting the strategies that they thought they could use to motivate 
employees for particular kinds of tasks. For example, managers recognized that praising 
employee accomplishment and progress (a promotion-inducing strategy) would lead employees 
to perform better when engaged in eagerness tasks, but that reminding employees to follow 
company rules and regulations (a prevention-inducing strategy) would lead employees to 
perform better when engaged in vigilance tasks. In addition, managers not only recognized the 
effectiveness of these strategies, but spontaneously generated such strategies when actually 
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trying to motivate a subordinate in an experimental paradigm. Later in the piece, we discuss the 
potential of our metamotivational approach for generating new insights into the management of 
others' motivations.  
Are metamotivational beliefs about promotion and prevention motivations 
culturally bound? As previously mentioned, our initial investigations of metamotivational 
knowledge (Scholer & Miele, 2016) suggested that participants might have biased expectations 
in favor of promotion-inducing strategies. We initially posited that this bias might have a cultural 
basis. The original studies were conducted in the United States and Canada and prior work has 
shown that North American participants tend to be predominantly promotion focused; further, 
this tends to be a cultural context in which "being motivated" is often equated with being 
pumped up, eager, and enthusiastic. We speculated that the bias might be eliminated or even 
reversed in countries where people tend to be more prevention focused, such as Japan (Higgins, 
2008).  
 However, our recent cross-cultural examination of this possibility suggests that the story 
is not so simple (Nguyen, Togawa, Miele, Scholer, & Fujita, 2019). Japanese participants, 
presented with the same materials as those in Scholer and Miele (2016), also showed a bias 
toward promotion-inducing strategies. Additional studies suggest that this bias may actually vary 
more as a function of people’s ability to detect the motivational affordances of a given task. As 
we discuss in more detail later in the piece, it is possible that some tasks, situations, and 
strategies vary in the strength of signals they convey about motivational states. For example, 
although a challenging proofreading task is optimally performed with a vigilant strategy, this 
task may not call for as much vigilance as an air traffic control simulation does. In one case, a 
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comma may be missed; in another, a plane may crash. Similarly, some strategies may be more 
clearly linked to a given motivational state than others.  
It is important to note that, regardless of signal strength, the materials that we used in our 
original studies focused on strategies participants could use to motivate themselves in an 
independent manner (i.e., what can I do on my own to motivate myself?). As mentioned above, 
these materials did not reveal any differences in the metamotivational beliefs of Japanese and 
American participants. However, when we presented people with materials that focused on 
strategies that they could use to motivate themselves in a more interdependent manner (e.g., what 
can I do for someone else in order to motivate myself?), cross-cultural differences did emerge 
(Nguyen, Togawa, Miele, et al., 2019). Specifically, when the means to induce a given 
motivational state directly affected the outcomes of others (e.g., if I perform well, my friend will 
gain versus lose money), Japanese participants were more sensitive to task-motivation fit than 
American participants. In sum, it appeared that Japanese participants had more tools at their 
disposal for creating task-motivation fit (i.e., they believed they could draw on a variety of 
independent and interdependent strategies).  
Metamotivational Knowledge About Autonomous and Controlled Motivations 
Another well-established way of categorizing and conceptualizing distinct motivations is 
on the basis of the autonomy-control continuum specified by self-determination theory (Deci & 
Ryan, 2000). At one end of the continuum is the interest and enjoyment that individuals associate 
with engaging in the task (i.e., intrinsic value). At the other end of the continuum is the extent to 
which individuals feel compelled to engage in the task because of some external force, such as 
perceived rewards or punishments (i.e., external value). Finally, in the middle of the continuum 
is the degree to which individuals value the task because they perceive it to be personally 
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relevant or aligned with some aspect of their identity (i.e., self-relevant value). Importantly, what 
we refer to as “self-relevant value” is comparable to the two autonomous types of regulation 
posited by self-determination theory (i.e., identified and integrated regulation), whereas “external 
value” roughly corresponds to the two controlled types of extrinsic regulation (i.e., external and 
introjected regulation). Thus, although self-relevant value is in the middle of the continuum, it is 
expected to elicit an autonomous form of motivation that is qualitatively more similar to intrinsic 
motivation than to the controlled form of motivation elicited by external value.  
Few would dispute that autonomous forms of motivation are beneficial in many 
situations. For instance, autonomous (relative to controlled) motivation is typically associated 
with increased persistence (Thoman, Smith, & Silvia, 2011) and greater psychological well-
being (Deci & Ryan, 2012). However, research suggests that using extrinsic incentives to 
increase controlled motivation can lead to enhanced performance on tasks that have strictly 
defined performance criteria and that demand a certain quantity of output (i.e., on close-ended 
tasks; e.g., Cerasoli et al., 2014; Kruglanski, Friedman, & Zeevi, 1971; Wimperis & Farr, 1979). 
These tasks tend not to require high absorption or intricacy, but instead involve structured and 
often speeded responses; they are typically evaluated based on the number of units produced, 
such as answering multiple choice questions, copying number matrices, or detecting in-text 
errors while proofreading. In contrast, research suggests that increasing autonomous forms of 
motivation enhance performance on tasks that have broader, quality-based performance criteria 
(i.e., on open-ended tasks; e.g., Cerasoli et al., 2014; Kruglanski et al., 1971). Such tasks 
typically require high levels of task-absorption and complex skill demonstration, as well as 
greater personal involvement. In addition, they are typically evaluated by comparing 
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performance to a standard that is separate from the quantity produced, such as the depth of one’s 
response to an essay question on an exam or the creativity of one’s problem solution.  
 In order to examine whether people are sensitive to the performance trade-offs that exist 
between autonomous and controlled forms of motivation, we employed the same types of 
paradigm used in the earlier studies on promotion and prevention motivations. Specifically, 
Edwards, Hubley, Scholer, and Miele (2019) presented participants with descriptions of open-
ended tasks (e.g., developing an engaging presentation on a topic of your choice) and close-
ended tasks (e.g., copying a series of letter matrices as quickly and accurately as possible) and, 
for each of them, asked participants to rate how helpful eight different motivation-enhancing 
strategies would be for motivating them on the task. In particular, two of the strategies targeted 
intrinsic value and were thought to enhance intrinsic motivation (e.g., “Consider the aspects of 
the task that make it interesting”), two targeted self-relevant value and were thought to enhance 
an autonomous form of extrinsic motivation (e.g., “Consider the aspects of the task that make it 
important to you”), two targeted external value and were thought to enhance a controlled form of 
extrinsic motivation (e.g., “Consider the rewards you might receive from completing this task”), 
and two were designed to be neutral (e.g., “Count to 10 before starting the task”).  
 Consistent with our previous work, the results of the study showed that participants did 
possess knowledge of task-motivation fit in this domain. On average, participants reported that 
strategies targeting external value would be more helpful than strategies targeting intrinsic value 
for close-ended tasks, but that strategies targeting intrinsic value would be more helpful for 
open-ended tasks. Interestingly, the perceived utility of the strategies targeting self-relevant 
value fell somewhere in between the perceive utility of the other two types of strategies for both 
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kinds of tasks, though (overall) participants tended to find the self-relevant strategies more 
helpful for the open-ended tasks than for the close-ended tasks. 
A similar pattern of results was observed in a subsequent study where, as opposed to 
being presented with distinct tasks, participants were given a single task that was framed as 
open-ended or close-ended based on how performance was to be assessed (i.e., “focus on 
analyzing the validity of the arguments in this text, while ignoring any spelling or grammatical 
errors” vs. “focus on identifying spelling and grammatical errors in this text, while ignoring the 
ideas that are expressed”). That is, participants who were asked to imagine the open-ended 
version of the task rated the strategies targeting intrinsic and self-relevant value as more helpful 
than did the participants who imagined the close-ended version. In contrast, there was no 
significant difference between conditions in participants’ ratings of the strategies targeting 
extrinsic value; though participants in the close-ended condition did rate the strategies targeting 
extrinsic value as more helpful than the strategies targeting intrinsic and self-relevant value. 
Participants in the open-ended condition did not view the three types of strategies as differing in 
helpfulness. Because only the focus of the task varied between conditions in this study, these 
findings provide strong support for the idea that people are sensitive to the fit between particular 
types of motivation and the processing demands of certain tasks (rather than perceiving a match 
between the motivations and some other aspect of the tasks).  
Finally, in another study by Edwards et al. (2019), participants’ knowledge of task-
motivation fit was shown to predict their choices of which motivation-inducing preparatory 
activities to engage in before two different tasks (with the expectation that they may be asked to 
perform one of the tasks). For the open-ended task, participants chose the activity targeting 
intrinsic value significantly more often (62.5%) than the activity targeting extrinsic value 
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(37.5%). In contrast, for the close-ended task, the pattern was reversed (46.4% vs. 53.6%); 
though this was not significantly different from chance. Thus, it appears that people are not only 
aware of the performance trade-offs associated with autonomous and controlled forms of 
motivation, but that this awareness can influence their attempts to regulate their motivation and 
maximize their performance.  
It is particularly interesting that participants appear to have knowledge of task-motivation 
fit in this domain given other work illustrating the biases people often hold about some of these 
strategies. For example, relative to other types of strategies (such as rewarding oneself), 
participants in a study by Sansone et al. (1992) believed that interest-enhancing strategies would 
be particularly effective in getting them to perform three different types of activities on a regular 
basis. At the same time, people often fail to recognize how extrinsic rewards can actually hurt 
intrinsic motivation (Murayama, Kitagami, Tanaka, & Raw, 2016) and do not seem to realize 
just how motivating intrinsic motivation can actually be (Woolley & Fishbach, 2015). Thus, an 
important direction for future research is to explore of how general beliefs about intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation influence people’s metamotivational understanding of task-motivation fit in 
this domain.  
Metamotivational Knowledge About High- and Low-Level Construal 
 It is well understood that people’s motivations and goals are hierarchically structured (see 
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Duckworth & Gross, 2014; Elliot, 2006; Kruglanski et al., 2002; 
Schwinger & Stiensmeier-Pelster, 2012; Trope & Liberman, 2010). At the highest levels of a 
hierarchy are the broad and abstract motivations people have that transcend any given set of 
circumstances. The lower levels of a hierarchy consist of the specific goals that people pursue in 
the service of their broad motivations – these goals are tailored to situations that are increasingly 
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more distinctive and idiosyncratic as one moves down through the hierarchy. Thus, by focusing 
on the higher levels of their goal hierarchies, people can remind themselves of their underlying 
reasons for engaging in a particular task; whereas, by focusing on the lower levels, they can 
become better attuned to the affordances that are available in the present context. 
Research suggests one factor that sensitizes people to higher vs. lower levels of their goal 
hierarchies is construal level. The term “construal” refers to people’s subjective understandings 
or interpretations of events. The notion that people subjectively construe – and thus 
motivationally orient – to the same task, object, or event in very different ways is central to 
construal level theory (e.g., Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2000). Construal level 
theory proposes that people can construe activities in terms of the abstract, global, and essential 
features that disparate tasks share in common (i.e., high-level construal), or in terms of the 
concrete, local, and idiosyncratic features that distinguish similar tasks from one another (i.e., 
low-level construal). For example, whereas construing an activity as “studying for an exam” 
highlights those features that all study activities share, such as acquiring information, construing 
the same activity as “quizzing myself with flashcards” highlights unique features that distinguish 
this activity from others forms of studying. An extensive literature demonstrates that shifts in 
construal level systematically impact evaluation, judgment, decision-making, and behavior (e.g., 
Fujita, Trope, & Liberman, 2015; Trope & Liberman, 2010).  
Importantly, high-level vs. low-level construal is particularly beneficial for performance 
on the kinds of self-control tasks where the value of a long-term or superordinate goal is pitted 
against the opportunity costs of having to forgo more immediate impulses or temptations (for a 
review, see Fujita & Carnevale, 2012; Kalkstein, Fujita, & Trope, 2018). For example, in a 
sample of participants concerned about weight-loss, those who were induced to approach a 
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decision task with a high-level construal were more likely to choose an apple over a candy bar 
compared to those who were induced to approach the task with a low-level construal (Fujita & 
Han, 2009). Presumably high-level construal made it easier evaluate their choices in light of their 
highly valued, superordinate goal of losing weight and to perceive the passing temptation of the 
candy bar as inconsistent with this goal (Carnevale, Fujita, Han, & Amit, 2015; see also Fujita, 
Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Malkoc, Zauberman, & Bettman, 2010).  
Although high-level construal may be generally adaptive when it comes to maintaining 
the strength of one’s task motivation, particularly in the face of conflicting impulses or 
temptations, it tends to elicit a “global” (versus “local”) mode of information processing that 
may undermine performance on certain kinds of tasks. For instance, research has shown that 
high-level relative to low-level construal leads to worse performance on tasks that require 
precision or sensitivity to contextual cues (e.g., Freund & Hennecke, 2015; Gollwitzer & 
Sheeran, 2006; Pham & Taylor, 1999; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Duke, 2011). More specifically, 
consider the stop-signal task (Logan, 1994) – a performance task requiring participants to inhibit 
habitual responses in response to infrequent stop cues. Participants who approach this kind of 
task with a low-level construal perform relatively well, presumably because their local mode of 
processing involves carefully monitoring their environment for these stop-cues, and modulating 
their behavior in response to them as necessary (Schmeichel et al., 2011). Other research 
suggests that low-level relative to high-level construal is beneficial for tasks that require skilled 
motor behavior, such as throwing darts (e.g., Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1997). Thus, similar to 
the previously discussed trade-offs associated with autonomy vs. control and promotion vs. 
prevention, research suggests that high- and low-level construal are beneficial for different kinds 
of tasks. 
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Accordingly, another way for people to establish task-motivation fit is to engage 
strategically in high-level construal when presented with tasks that benefit from focusing on 
one’s more abstract, superordinate motivations and goals (e.g., self-control tasks), but to engage 
in low-level construal when faced with tasks that benefit from a focus on more local 
considerations (e.g., tasks requiring precision and contextual sensitivity). Initial work examining 
this possibility focused solely on people’s knowledge of the benefits of high-level construal for 
self-control (MacGregor, Carnevale, Dusthimer, & Fujita, 2017). In one experiment, participants 
were asked to imagine participating in a market research study that entailed eating cookies that 
were tasty but not very healthy. To manipulate the presence vs. absence of self-control conflict, 
half were asked to imagine having the goal of refraining from eating too many cookies (self-
control condition); the other half were asked to imagine having the goal of enjoying their eating 
(control condition). Participants then indicated how useful it would be for achieving their 
respective goals to ask themselves “why” (or “why not”) versus “how” (or “how not”) they 
would engage in this cookie eating task. Whereas asking the question “why” is associated with 
high-level construal, asking the question “how” is associated with low-level construal (e.g., 
Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004; Liberman & Trope, 1998). Participants correctly indicated 
that thinking about “why” relative to “how” would be more useful in the restraint relative to 
control conditions. In other experiments, participants reported that thinking about the event in 
more abstract vs. concrete language—another manifestation of high- vs. low-level construal 
(e.g., Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006; Semin & Fiedler, 1988)—would 
similarly enhance restraint. Collectively, these findings suggest that people do, at some level, 
understand the self-control benefits of high- vs. low-level construal. 
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Subsequent research has explored people’s knowledge of the regulatory benefits of both 
high- and low-level construal (Nguyen, Carnevale et al., 2019). In these studies, the tasks that 
benefited from high-level construal all involved some type of self-control (such as choosing 
between smaller-immediate vs. larger-delayed monetary outcomes); whereas the tasks that 
benefited from low-level construal involved some element of precision and/or contextual 
sensitivity (such as completing a stop-signal task or throwing darts). As an exploratory control 
condition, participants were also presented with tasks for which performance was not expected to 
benefit more from high- or low-level construal (such as daydreaming on a bus or going out to 
dinner with friends).   
For each regulatory task, participants were asked to indicate which of two preparatory 
exercises they would prefer to complete in order to “set their mind.”  These preparatory exercises 
were all inductions of high- vs. low-level construal that had been validated in previous research.  
In one study, for example, participants were told that the exercises would require engaging in 
global versus local visual processing, respectively (e.g., Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; Smith, 
Wigboldus, & Dijksterhuis, 2008; Wakslak & Trope, 2009). In another study, participants 
indicated preferences for exercises that required engaging in superordinate category versus 
subordinate exemplar generation (e.g., Fujita, Trope et al., 2006). To correctly match the 
appropriate preparatory exercise to the corresponding regulatory task, participants needed to not 
only recognize which construal level would benefit task performance, but to also identify which 
of the preparatory exercises would best instantiate the preferred construal level. In this way, 
participants’ endorsement of one exercise over the other in response to each of the three types of 
regulatory tasks (high-level vs. low-level vs. control) represented the critical assessment of 
metamotivational task and strategy knowledge. 
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Results revealed that participants did correctly recognize the benefits of a high- vs. low-
level preparatory exercise when faced with tasks for which performance benefits from high- vs. 
low-level construal, respectively. For instance, before making decisions between smaller-
immediate vs. larger-delayed monetary rewards, participants indicated that they preferred the 
preparatory exercise that entailed global vs. local visual processing. By contrast, when 
completing a stop-signal task, participants indicated that they preferred the preparatory exercise 
that entailed subordinate exemplar vs. superordinate category generation. The fact that 
participants were sensitive to task-motivation fit across a broad range of tasks and preparatory 
exercises suggests that people’s metamotivational knowledge about the functions of high- and 
low-level construal may be fairly broad and sophisticated. 
Importantly, this metamotivational knowledge (like knowledge about promotion and 
prevention motivation) appears to be universal and not bound to a specific culture. Cross-cultural 
tests comparing responses of American vs. Japanese participants reveal similar patterns of results 
(Nguyen, Togawa, Scholer, & Fujita, 2019). Specifically, when asked to indicate preferences of 
preparatory exercises in response to high-level vs. low-level regulatory tasks, Japanese 
participants showed the same ability to create task-motivation fit as Americans – suggesting 
similar metamotivational task and strategy knowledge.   
Although research indicates that people are aware of the performance trade-offs 
associated with high- vs. low-level construal, there was notable individual-level variance in this 
awareness. For example, in one of the studies by Nguyen, Carnevale et al. (2019; Study 6), only 
41% of the sample selected an appropriate preparatory exercise for both of the regulatory tasks, 
whereas 12.5% selected an inappropriate exercise in both cases and 46% overgeneralized their 
preference for a particular preparatory exercise across both tasks. This individual-level variance 
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in strategy preference should have important consequences for how effective people are at 
regulating their motivation and, consequently, how well they perform on tasks.  
Preliminary evidence for this assertion comes from the studies by MacGregor et al. 
(2017). For example, in one study, participants were asked whether describing the act of eating 
cookies in more abstract vs. concrete language would benefit restraint. Critically, participants 
also reported on their degree of dieting motivation, as well as their height and weight (which was 
used to calculate body mass index). Among participants who were higher in dieting concerns, 
those who correctly reported that abstract language would be more beneficial for restraint had 
lower body mass indices, suggesting greater self-control. In another study, undergraduate 
students in an Introduction to Social Psychology course were asked to describe how they would 
overcome temptations when preparing for their final exam. They also reported how important 
and valuable they perceived the course to be and gave the researchers permission to access their 
final grades in the course. Among students who highly valued the course, those who described 
their willpower efforts in more abstract relative to concrete terms received higher grades in the 
course, again suggesting enhanced self-control. Collectively, this provides initial evidence that 
those with metamotivational knowledge of the benefits of high-level construal experienced 
superior self-control outcomes. 
Implications 
Advancing Motivation Science Research 
The metamotivation approach outlined in this piece advances motivation science in a 
number of ways. First, by suggesting that both the quantity and quality of motivation can be the 
target of regulation, it helps to bridge existing research on motivation regulation (which tends to 
focus on motivation quantity) with theories that posit qualitatively distinct types of motivation. 
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On the one hand, the fact that people seem to know about the performance trade-offs associated 
with different types of motivation suggests that they can regulate their motivation in ways that 
were not previously appreciated. For example, rather than simply bolstering the overall strength 
of their motivation, people can also instantiate the particular motivational state that best fits the 
demands of the current task (e.g., MacGregor et al., 2017; Nguyen, Carnevale et al., 2019; 
Scholer & Miele, 2016). In addition, rather than attempting to change their motivation in some 
way (whether it be quantitatively or qualitatively), they can choose a particular task to engage in 
that they think will benefit from the kind of motivation they are currently experiencing (Scholer 
& Miele, 2016; see also Delose, vanDellen, & Hoyle, 2015). On the other hand, the fact that 
people know about the differential benefits of promotion vs. prevention, autonomy vs. control, 
and high- vs low-level construal also helps to expand our understanding of regulatory focus 
theory, self-determination theory, and construal level theory. For instance, it suggests that people 
may have the capacity to use construal level strategically in their everyday lives. Thus, rather 
than serving as artificial lab-based manipulations, construal level inductions can perhaps be used 
as regulatory strategies in real-world contexts.  
Knowledge as a Source of Self-Regulatory Success vs. Failure 
A second major advance of the metamotivational approach is spotlighting the accuracy or 
inaccuracy of people’s beliefs about motivation as a source of goal success vs. failure. Self-
regulation research has traditionally focused on the ways in which people use strategies or 
exercise abilities (e.g., inhibit undesired thoughts, emotions, and behavioral tendencies) to 
broadly exert control over their motivation. For instance, many of the motivation regulation 
studies from within educational psychology have focused on how students’ general use of 
regulation strategies predicts their academic achievement and other outcomes (e.g., Grunschel et 
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al., 2016; Kim et al., 2018; Schwinger et al., 2009). Similarly, self-regulation research from the 
cognitive control tradition is largely predicated on the idea that basic cognitive capacities such as 
executive attention, executive functioning, and working memory play central roles in people’s 
goal pursuit efforts across contexts (e.g., Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Hofmann, Schmeichel, & 
Baddeley, 2012; Posner & Rothbart, 1998). 
In contrast, the metamotivational approach suggests that understanding people’s 
strategies and abilities provides only partial insight into the self-regulation puzzle – one still 
needs to know when to deploy these skills. Any inaccurate or erroneous beliefs about when it is 
appropriate to apply these skills (i.e., in what context and for which task) are likely to undermine 
effective self-regulation. Thus, as opposed to focusing solely on how people exert control, our 
framework also focuses on how people monitor the situation and their internal states based on 
their metamotivational knowledge. 
Importantly, focusing on what people know about motivation, rather than their general 
self-regulatory strategies and capacities, pushes researchers to move beyond trying to account for 
who is “good” or “bad” at self-regulating across contexts and to instead focus on what types of 
tasks particular individuals are likely to struggle with. Consider, for example, the self-regulatory 
efforts of concert pianists. To be successful, pianists must overcome the drudgery and frustration 
of daily practice in favor of perfecting their craft. They must also execute these learned skills and 
make appropriate adjustments when performing on a specific piano in a particular concert hall on 
any given day. Whereas high-level construal should promote the former type of behavior, low-
level construal should promote the latter. The pianist who erroneously believes that engaging in 
high-level construal is always beneficial for task performance can be expected to endure and 
persist in daily practice, but may be insensitive to the subtle contextual cues that make for 
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successful recital performances. Conversely, the pianist who erroneously believes that engaging 
in low-level construal is always beneficial for task performance is likely to exhibit the opposite 
pattern: regularly giving daily practices short shrift, but being hyper-tuned to the subtle cues in 
the performance environment. Both pianists are likely to struggle to attain their goals, but for 
very different reasons.  
The previous example highlights how differences in metamotivational task knowledge 
can help explain why the same person might regulate her motivation in an effective manner on 
one task, but not on another. Further, in our framework, successful self-regulation also requires 
accurate strategy knowledge and self-knowledge. Thus, even people with a sophisticated 
understanding of the performance trade-offs associated with various types of motivation may 
struggle to successfully regulate their motivation at times. For instance, such a person may 
mistakenly believe that she is already in a motivational state that is adaptive for the current task 
when she is in fact not (poor self-knowledge); as a result, she may begin the task motivationally 
unprepared and then perform in a suboptimal manner. Similarly, another individual may possess 
accurate task and self-knowledge, but not know how to shift herself into the motivational state 
that she believes will be more adaptive for the task than the state she is currently experiencing 
(poor strategy knowledge). Exploring each type of knowledge systematically will be key to 
understanding who, when, and why some individuals succeed at regulating their motivational 
states, whereas others fail. 
The Centrality of Flexibility 
The previous example also highlights a third advance of the metamotivational approach, 
which is the importance of motivational flexibility for self-regulatory success. In contrast to some 
other theories of motivation, the metamotivational approach takes as a given that no single 
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motivational orientation or state ensures success. An orientation that is best suited for one task 
may undermine performance on another. Successful self-regulation requires people to be 
sensitive to the changing motivational demands across various tasks and to shift their 
motivational orientation to match these changing demands. If people are unable to shift their 
motivational states, optimal self-regulation may require that they instead be more flexible in 
what tasks they perform first. In either case, rather than insist on a one-size-fits-all approach, the 
metamotivation approach suggests that effective self-regulation requires tailoring one’s response 
to the motivational affordances of different situations and tasks.  
Future Directions 
Predicting Real-World Outcomes 
Our metamotivational research to-date has largely focused on understanding what 
people’s beliefs about motivation are and the extent to which they are accurate vs. inaccurate. A 
central assertion of the metamotivational approach, however, is that these beliefs guide people’s 
efforts at regulating their motivation and should therefore impact performance and other 
outcomes. Some work has shown that these beliefs impact which strategies people choose to 
implement or which tasks they decide to engage in (e.g., Edwards et al., 2019; Nguyen, 
Carnevale et al., 2019; Scholer & Miele, 2016) – an important component of self-regulation (e.g., 
Gollwitzer, 1999). Other work provides preliminary evidence that people’s metamotivational 
knowledge may predict goal success in domains such as weight-loss and academics (e.g., 
MacGregor et al., 2017; Ross et al., 2019). This work notwithstanding, more research needs to be 
conducted to establish and characterize the impact of metamotivational knowledge on 
performance and outcomes in real-world contexts. 
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The ability to predict performance and other outcomes may require further development 
and validation of diagnostic assessments of this knowledge. Research to-date has largely adopted 
indirect measurement strategies in which participants are presented with various scenarios and 
asked to select options based on their preferences or expectations (e.g., Murayama et al., 2016; 
Nguyen, Carnevale, et al., 2019; Scholer & Miele, 2016). An alternative strategy has been to 
observe participants’ spontaneous responses in critical goal-relevant contexts and to then code 
these responses as reflecting accurate vs. inaccurate beliefs (e.g., MacGregor et al., 2017). An 
important question that arises is whether one assessment approach is superior to the other in 
predicting behavior. Similarly, it may also be possible that more direct measurement approaches 
– such as directly asking participants what they think the best response to a situation might be – 
may be equally or more valid for prediction. 
It is also important to note that the existing measurement approaches involve coding 
responses as accurate or inaccurate depending on whether they align with theoretical predictions 
and/or past empirical findings. Thus, another important question is whether the accuracy of 
people’s metamotivational beliefs should instead be assessed based on how well each individual 
performs a task when experiencing a particular motivational state (rather than on how people 
perform more generally). For example, although individuals generally persist longer on open-
ended tasks when experiencing intrinsic motivation, a particular individual may find that she 
persists longer on such tasks when motivated by extrinsic incentives. In this case, we would not 
want to label the person’s beliefs about the utility of extrinsic motivation to be inaccurate. Using 
a person’s own performance as the standard for assessing the accuracy of her beliefs is an 
approach that is common in the metacognition literature (see Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). 
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Clearly, questions about how best to measure people’s metamotivational beliefs are ripe for 
future research. 
Self-Knowledge 
Most research on metamotivation has focused on whether people have task and strategy 
knowledge concerning various motivational states, such as promotion/prevention, 
autonomy/control, and high/low level construal (Edwards et al., 2019; Nguyen, Carnevale et al., 
2019; Scholer & Miele, 2016). Almost no work to-date has examined the third type of 
knowledge that we view as necessary for regulating one’s own motivation – i.e., insight into 
one’s motivational states and tendencies (see Flavell, 1979; Pintrich, 2002, for a discussion of 
self-knowledge in the metacognitive domain). In our framework, self-knowledge is necessary for 
determining whether and to what extent one needs to modulate one’s own motivation. For 
instance, although a person may know that she should approach a particular task with a 
prevention focus, she may not take steps to shift herself into this motivational state unless she 
realizes that she is currently experiencing a promotion focus.  
Our metamotivational framework highlights innovative directions that research on self-
knowledge might explore. Two important questions that arise are what do particular motivational 
states subjectively feel like, and what cues do people use to recognize that they are in these 
states. Motivation science has traditionally taken for granted that people can identify the quantity 
of motivation that they are experiencing, but whether they can accurately identify the quality of 
their motivation is unknown. The ability to self-report intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivation reliably 
(e.g., Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994; Vallerand et al., 1992) may suggest that people 
do have insight into the quality of their motivational states. What is less well-known, however, is 
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how people come to understand that they are in a promotion vs. prevention focus or a high-level 
vs. low-level construal state.  
In other work (Miele & Scholer, 2018), we have suggested that people may monitor and 
manage their motivations by attending to their metamotivational feelings. For instance, feelings 
such as hope or excitement (as well as related thoughts and behaviors) may at times serve as 
metamotivational cues that signal the presence of promotion motivation. As with the monitoring 
of any internal state, people may differ widely in terms of how much self-insight that they 
possess. Thus, research might also seek to explore predictors of individual or temporal variation 
in people’s levels of self-insight (i.e., what makes some people particularly good at detecting 
their motivational states?). Individual differences in interoceptive (Critchley & Garfinkel, 2017) 
and mood awareness (Swinkels & Giuliano, 1995) seem like particularly strong candidates for 
such exploration. In addition, it is possible that situational factors, such as objective self-
awareness (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972), may also enhance the perceptibility of motivational 
states.   
Another aspect of self-knowledge that will be important to explore is the implicit theories 
people use to interpret their motivational experiences (including their metamotivational feelings). 
For instance, when people feel bored during a task and are in danger of quitting, the likelihood 
they will take steps to increase their motivation may depend on whether or not they believe that 
their experiences of interest or boredom are changeable. Consistent with this possibility, Thoman 
et al. (in press) recently showed that participants’ implicit beliefs about interest predicted their 
use of interest regulation strategies during a boring task. Other researchers (King, 2019) have 
measured these beliefs more broadly and found that they are associated with students’ academic 
engagement. Future research should explore the extent to which people’s beliefs about the 
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malleability of specific motivational constructs (e.g., interest, task value, self-efficacy) are 
associated with their more general beliefs about motivation. 
Creating Fit 
The extant metamotivation literature has generally focused on how people create task-
motivation fit by bolstering or shifting their motivational states. Yet one can also create task-
motivation fit by choosing tasks that fit one’s current motivational states. Although the research 
we have reviewed indicates that people create fit through both mechanisms (e.g., Scholer & 
Miele, 2016), the creation of fit via task selection represents an understudied area in motivation 
research. This oversight is surprising, however, given that this is a critical problem for people 
attempting to balance the pursuit of multiple goals. The exploration of this issue through the lens 
of metamotivation may open new lines of inquiry that examine the question of when people 
choose to pursue which goal. 
In some cases, people may actively choose between modulating their motivational states 
vs. strategically selecting the tasks they complete. Both approaches can be used to optimize task 
performance, yet people may differ in their ability and/or preference to regulate in each of these 
two ways. Those who struggle to modify or modulate their internal states, for example, may be 
unable to re-orient motivationally, and thus prefer to regulate the order in which they complete 
certain tasks. By contrast, those who lack independence or the authority to choose what to do 
may have to resort to regulating their underlying motivational orientations. The metamotivational 
approach thus proposes that future research should systematically explore the questions of who, 
when, and why people create motivational fit by modulating their motivational states vs. 
prioritizing some tasks over others. 
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A third approach to regulating motivation (an approach originally suggested by 
regulatory fit theory; Higgins, 2000) is to strategically approach tasks in a manner that fits with 
one’s chronic and perhaps preferred orientation, irrespective of task demands. Someone who is 
chronically motivated by promotion, for example, may generally prefer eager information 
processing strategies, even when task performance might benefit from prevention. To the extent 
that it is uncomfortable or difficult for this person to sustain the orientation demanded by the task 
(Lisjak, Molden, & Lee, 2012), she may ultimately decide to abandon efforts to create task-
motivation fit. Instead, she may “double-down” on her preferred chronic motivational state and 
amplify engagement by trying to establish what we have referred to as orientation-strategy fit 
(Scholer & Miele, 2016).  
A related question that future research should address is how people choose between 
different motivational states when several might be adaptive. Consider, for example, tasks that 
require vigilance, such as proofreading. The drive to ensure against losses that is elicited by a 
prevention orientation should enhance performance. The orientation toward detail and narrowed 
attentional focus of low-level construal, however, should similarly promote performance. How 
people choose between multiple adaptive orientations (or perhaps combine orientations) is an 
important question to resolve, particularly if researchers hope to predict behavior. Conversely, it 
is also important to consider how certain orientations might be simultaneously adaptive and 
maladaptive for a particular task. For instance, consider a task that requires precise motor control 
but also involves a self-control conflict (such as trying to practice for your piano recital when 
your brother wants you to come play video games). On the one hand, adopting a high-level 
construal would help with inhibiting the impulse to play video games; but, on the other hand, it 
would elicit a global attentional focus that might undermine the quality of one’s practice. In such 
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cases, it could be beneficial to approach the task by engaging in low level construal and then 
selectively implement a regulation strategy that induces a high-level construal each time the 
temptation to quit practicing becomes salient. 
Development and Acquisition of Knowledge 
A critical question that we have only recently begun to address concerns the development 
and acquisition of metamotivational beliefs. Recent evidence suggests that children as young as 
seven appear to have some knowledge of how promotion and prevention motivations fit with 
different tasks (i.e., task knowledge; Scholer, Hartman, Hubley, Wilson, & Henderson, 2019), 
though they do not appear to fully understand how to induce these states in themselves (i.e., 
strategy knowledge). Specifically, children were told about a Lego task in which they would 
have to use their imagination to construct an original building that might exist in the future (i.e., 
a task that required eager processing) or a Lego task in which they would have to construct a 
building following very specific rules (i.e., a task that required vigilant processing). They were 
also presented with descriptions of promotion and prevention motivations. Similar to the college 
students in our original studies (Scholer & Miele, 2016), children reported that they would 
perform better on the eager versus vigilant task when promotion-focused, but would perform 
better on the vigilant versus eager task when prevention-focused (task knowledge). Children 
were also asked to report how particular strategies—focusing on their strengths or focusing on 
their weaknesses—would affect performance, given prior work linking these strategies to the 
upregulation of promotion and prevention motivation, respectively (Scholer, Ozaki, & Higgins, 
2014). Although children exhibited accurate task knowledge, children did not exhibit accurate 
strategy knowledge with these specific strategies.  
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These findings suggest that children might acquire particular types of metamotivational 
knowledge at different points in development. They also raise the question of where children 
acquire this knowledge and who they acquire it from. One possibility is that caregivers teach 
children about the nature of motivation as the latter encounter various motivational challenges.  
For example, children may be taught to construe temptations in high-level terms (e.g., focus on 
why it is important to wait until the morning to open Christmas gifts) as a means of enhancing 
self-control. By contrast, when learning precise performance skills such as playing the piano, 
children might instead be taught to construe these challenges in low-level terms (e.g., focus on 
playing this note with this finger in this way). These experiences may teach children how to 
distinguish different types of regulatory demands and help them identify the various ways to 
optimize their current motivational states. Alternatively, people may learn through trial-and-
error. That is, if a particular strategy for dealing with a given regulatory challenge has worked in 
the past, people may continue to use it in similar situations; but if it leads to poor outcomes, they 
may be more likely to test other strategies. It is also possible that people logically deduce 
metamotivational knowledge, much as researchers have done to develop theories of self-
regulation and motivation. Researchers should consider examining these possibilities 
developmentally, as people may acquire metamotivational beliefs via different routes depending 
on age. For example, it might be unreasonable to expect young children to acquire 
metamotivational knowledge via logical deduction given what we know about their cognitive 
development (Ricco, 2015).  
A related question is how best to transmit metamotivational knowledge. As noted earlier, 
existing research has assumed certain types of metamotivational knowledge to be tacit or 
implicit. This might suggest that this knowledge would be better acquired via experiential rather 
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than didactic mechanisms. For instance, teachers and experts might not be able to explain how to 
respond to various regulatory challenges, but they may be able to show students by repeatedly 
modeling behavior in a wide range of circumstances. Alternatively, to the extent that people do 
have insight into their metamotivational knowledge, it may be possible to transmit this 
knowledge to others through direct teaching. Addressing these questions will be necessary for 
the development of interventions and instructional practices aimed at increasing people’s 
metamotivational knowledge and improving their self-regulation. 
Another intriguing possibility is that people may learn to regulate their own motivation 
through efforts to motivate others. Coaches, teachers, mentors, and employers must all exhort 
others to work harder and to achieve ever higher levels of performance. It may be that the 
regulation of others’ motivations informs people about how best to regulate their own 
motivational states. The demands of the social roles people play (e.g., working as a coach who is 
responsible for the performance of 50 athletes) may incentivize and encourage them to attend to 
and study the co-variation between various motivational states, tasks, and outcomes (e.g., 
promotion motivation leads to more goals when the team is on offense). Conversely, possessing 
accurate metamotivational knowledge about one’s own motivational states may make one more 
effective in these high-responsibility social roles. For example, someone who understands how to 
establish task-motivation fit for herself may be particularly good at assigning tasks to people 
based on their motivational tendencies (i.e., at creating task-motivation fit for others; see Jansen 
et al., 2019). In these ways, investigating the antecedents and consequences of metamotivational 
knowledge in the interpersonal domain promises to be a generative and insightful extension of 
the present approach. 
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Linking Metamotivation to General Motivational Competency 
Metamotivation research has largely examined people’s knowledge of motivational 
orientations or states in isolation. That is, in separate lines of research, investigators have 
examined what people know about promotion vs. prevention, high-level vs. low-level construal, 
and intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivation. Less has been done to examine the extent to which 
knowledge might be correlated across these domains. It may be the case that those who are 
particularly motivationally skilled have high levels of knowledge across multiple domains – a 
kind of motivational “g” that predicts success at securing desired ends across a number of 
contexts. One might expect individuals high in this general ability to evidence superior self-
regulatory outcomes.   
In keeping with this idea, future research might link metamotivational knowledge to 
constructs such as grit. Grit is conceptualized as a trait that allows people to pursue long-term 
goals with passion and perseverance (e.g., Duckworth & Gross, 2014). From a metamotivational 
perspective, grit entails maintaining one’s motivation over long durations of time and in the face 
of challenges (see also Jachimowicz, Wihler, Bailey, & Galinksy, 2018). Rather than 
conceptualize grit as a trait, however, the metamotivational approach suggests that grit is a skill – 
the ability to implement strategies that maintain the right amount and type of motivation to 
pursue a goal. Critically, whereas a trait approach provides little insight into how best to increase 
or improve grit, the metamotivational approach highlights the possession of accurate knowledge 
and the appropriate implementation of this knowledge as key to improving self-regulation. Thus, 
whereas the trait approach typically espoused by grit researchers may help identify individuals 
likely to persist or not, the metamotivational approach not only identifies these individuals but 
also provides concrete guidelines for intervention and improvement. Empirical research is 
METAMOTIVATION  45 
needed, however, to link metamotivational knowledge directly to grit and to other related 
constructs.   
Toward a Comprehensive Mechanistic Model of Metamotivation 
 Our review and discussion of the existing metamotivation literature has focused on 
people’s regulation of the quality rather than the quantity of motivation. As noted before, this 
emphasis reflects the fact that regulation of quality is a key hallmark of our metamotivational 
framework. We do not, however, suggest that the regulation of motivation quantity is a less 
critical metamotivational process; in fact, we argue that more research is needed to understand 
how people monitor and control the degree to which they are motivated to pursue their task 
goals. An important aim of future research should therefore be to develop a comprehensive 
mechanistic framework that models both the regulation of quantity and quality of motivation (see 
Miele & Scholer, 2018, for an initial attempt at this).   
One key question that a comprehensive mechanistic framework must address is how 
people determine that they have the right amount and type of motivation to achieve their goals. 
In a prior review (Miele & Scholer, 2018), we suggested that they accomplish this in part by 
monitoring and strategically modulating the specific components that underlie their motivation 
(e.g., intrinsic value, self-relevant value, self-efficacy), rather than focusing solely on some broad 
or holistic experience of motivation (see Engelschalk, Steuer, & Dresel, 2016; Sansone et al., 
1992; Wolters, 1998). In addition, we posited several criteria for identifying the components that 
people target when regulating their motivation, including the possibility that high levels of such 
components are associated with unique sets of phenomenological feelings or experiences. As 
discussed earlier, these metamotivational feelings may play an important role in detecting the 
quality of one’s current motivational states (e.g., whether one is promotion- or prevention-
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focused; Miele & Scholer, 2018). Metamotivational feelings, however, may also serve as 
important inputs for determining whether one is insufficiently motivated (i.e., low quantity) or is 
not motivated to perform a task in the right way (i.e., lack of task-motivation fit). 
As an example of a feeling that signals a motivational deficit, consider boredom. The 
experience of boredom may signal to an individual that her initial interest in the task (which gave 
rise to an experience of intrinsic motivation) is being undermined by the costs associated with 
performing that task (e.g., when a textbook chapter is so dull that a student is no longer interested 
in the material or does not want to continue reading). If the feeling is strong enough and is 
accompanied by a desire to disengage from the task, the individual may decide to implement a 
strategy that either bolsters the motivation component in question (i.e., intrinsic value) or 
eliminate the costs that are interfering with it. If the strategy is successful, the individual may 
come to experience a renewed interest in the task. This interest signals to the person that no 
further regulation is necessary. In this way, metamotivational feelings may initiate and terminate 
metamotivational regulation in a bottom-up manner during task completion or goal pursuit.  
To the extent that metamotivational feelings are like other types of metacognitive and 
affective states that operate at the “fringe” of consciousness, they are presumably capable of 
representing “large amounts of information in a condensed format, to avoid exceeding the 
limited capacity of consciousness” (Norman, Price, & Duff, 2010, p. 68). Thus, 
metamotivational feelings may allow people to monitor their motivation in an efficient manner, 
while maintaining their focus on the primary activity (e.g., learning the material). That is, rather 
than having to continually interrupt their execution of a task in order to check if they are 
sufficiently motivated to continue, people can instead wait until their metamotivational feelings 
automatically trigger the use of a particular regulation strategy.  
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In addition to signaling deficits in the quantity of motivation, metamotivational feelings 
may also signal a lack of compatibility between the quality of one’s motivation and the demands 
of the current task (i.e., a lack of task-motivation fit). This possibility is line with regulatory fit 
theory (Higgins, 2000), which suggests that when individuals engage in strategies (e.g., eager vs. 
vigilant information processing) that do not match their underlying motivational orientation (e.g., 
promotion vs. prevention), they experience a feeling of “nonfit” (of going about the task in the 
wrong manner) that is demotivating (Higgins, 2000). If an individual responds to this feeling by 
taking steps to shift herself into a type of motivation that is more compatible with the task, she 
may come to experience a feeling of “fit” (of going about the task in the right manner) that is 
energizing and that is associated with improved performance, goal commitment, and task 
enjoyment (Higgins, 2000). 
Summary 
 In this piece, we have spotlighted an emerging area of motivation science research – 
namely, metamotivation. This approach is novel in that it suggests that people modulate both the 
quality and quantity of their motivational states in order to achieve desired ends. Given that 
motivational states are often critical precursors to how people think, feel, and act—the targets of 
traditional approaches to self-regulation—research on metamotivation may reveal particularly 
efficient means by which people can regulate their goal pursuit. We have reviewed research that 
indicates that people often have the requisite metamotivational knowledge to leverage promotion 
vs. prevention orientations, autonomous vs. controlled motivations, and high- vs. low-level 
construals to enhance performance on goal-directed tasks. At the same time, there is variability 
in the accuracy of these beliefs, suggesting clear opportunities for intervention. We hope to 
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inspire others to pursue the many innovative and novel research questions that the 
metamotivational framework raises, and look forward to the insights such work will provide. 
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